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U.S. Relations with the People's Republic of China (2005)

U.S. Department of State

The Six-party Talks

Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
Foreign Press Center Briefing
Washington, DC
October 4, 2005

2:30 P.M. EDT

MR. BOOKBINDER: Good afternoon. Welcome to the Foreign Press Center. We are very pleased this afternoon to have Assistant Secretary Christopher Hill again with us to talk about the six-party talks. Assistant Secretary Hill will make opening remarks and then we'll take your questions.

Thank you. Assistant Secretary.

AMBASSADOR HILL: Well, thank you very much and it's a pleasure to be back here to discuss, I guess, my favorite subject and maybe your favorite subject. Saturday night, I attended the Chinese festival at the Kennedy Center and I had to note that it was actually the second Chinese festival I had attended in the last few weeks, the first being at the Diaoyutai Guesthouse.

You know, the six-party talks will continue. We had, I think, a pretty successful fourth round. It took 20 days and nights at the Diaoyutai Guesthouse to get there. I must say there were moments in the first round, in the first part and the second part where I wasn't sure whether we were going to succeed, but I think all of the delegations, all six, really were committed to finding a way to go forward and I think because of that dedication on the part of all the delegations, we were able to find a way to put together the set of principles.

As we always made clear, the set of principles is but a means to show us the way to the next phase, which is to try to fashion a set of measures to implement these principles. And to be sure, if you thought the principles were difficult, the implementation measures, I think, will be even more difficult.

So in the two weeks since I've been back from Beijing and I suspect in the several weeks I have to go before I have to return to Beijing, we will be doing a lot of discussion internally and among other partners as to the way forward. There is clearly a lot to do. One issue is the question of how we sequence the various measures that we have in mind, beginning with the DPRK's commitment to abandon all nuclear weapons and all nuclear programs, all the existing nuclear programs. That is going to be a very important aspect of implementation. We're going to have to see how we can implement that and then verify that it's been implemented.

But of course, we also have to take some measures on our side, specifically, to move ahead on some of the other elements, including normalization of relations, which is also going to be a complex series of issues.

So for us on the past two weeks, we've had a lot of internal discussions here in Washington. I know our other partners are also having their internal discussions. We've been in touch with each other by phone but I'm sure we will begin to fashion a travel schedule in the next week or so and we'll figure out where we go, both literally and figuratively, from there.

I know people always ask me if I'm optimistic, if I'm pessimistic. I suppose it depends what day of the week it is, but I will tell you today that we did make a lot of progress in Beijing. It doesn't mean that we've seen the end of this process or that we can yet predict the end of the process. But certainly I think it was very important that we worked closely with our partners in this and where we, I think, developed a pretty clear consensus.

I know that immediately after the agreement in Beijing, there were some signs from Pyongyang that their understanding wasn't the same as the rest of our understanding. On the other hand, two days later, there was still another version of it. But I know because I was there and I know very clearly that all of the participants understand what they signed up for. And with respect to the issue of future peaceful use, which was I think a rather hot topic during the hot days of August -- in fact, when I was here -- it is very clear that we have laid out a plan by which the DPRK must first abandon its weapons, abandon all its existing nuclear programs, get itself back into the Nonproliferation Treaty, a treaty that it withdrew from earlier, and then get itself back into that treaty in good standing, meaning get itself back into the treaty with IAEA safeguards. And only after that and at an appropriate time, will we consider having the discussion about the subject of the provision of a light-water reactor.

So as you can see, this is not the really urgent issue. The really urgent issue is what we're dealing with in the initial phase, which is they've got to get out of this weapons producing and out of the nuclear program business. And so that's going to be very much on our minds and, you know, downstream, once they're back into the NPT in good standing and with IAEA safeguards, can we look at that other elements.

I continue to believe that this arrangement, the overall shape of this arrangement is not only a very positive plan for the United States and for our partners, but also very much for the DPRK. This is the future of the DPRK. If they can get through this, if they can take the tough decision to do away with programs, programs that they've had for some quarter of a century and maybe more, if they can make that decision, I think their future will be much brighter.

I think there will be reason to believe that they can get more energy. And as you know, a very important element of the agreement is the South Korean provision of conventional energy, which is exactly equivalent to the energy that was foreseen in the 1990's arrangement, that is the agreed framework -- 2000 megawatts -- and that is to be provided from South Korea by conventional means.

So this is a huge undertaking just by itself. So there is a lot on the table with this arrangement. I think it's very, very important to the DPRK that it understands that if it values security, if it values its economic future, it will value this six-party accord. So I hope we have that understanding and we will certainly try to go forward from there.

So those are, sort of, opening comments and then we go to questions.

[ ...Intervening Text... ]

MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay, we'll go to China in the fourth row.

QUESTION: Hi, Mr. Secretary, I'm Yi Zhao from the Xinhua News Agency of China. I would like to ask you, do you have any plan to have more talks with DPRK through New York channel? That's the first question.

The other is that you said a lot of progress has been made in the six-party talks. Are you very much optimistic about the future talks? Do you -- does the United States, U.S. Government, have enough patience or very much patience for the future talks?

Thank you.

AMBASSADOR HILL: Well, believe me, I'm a patient guy. I hope I demonstrated that in the previous talks. I would hope that if we can continue the atmosphere of the previous talks, which was tough but businesslike, I think everyone understood why we were there and everyone was committed to finding an arrangement. If we can preserve that, I believe we can make progress in the next set of talks even though the next set of talks is going to be a very, very difficult phase.

I can't predict, for example, that we'll have a big announcement after one session. We may have small announcements after several sessions. It's just hard to predict at this point. But as the previous question suggested about sequencing, and, you know, these are going to be tough issues, but I think if we continue in the spirit we did in the first set of talks, if your delegation in particular, the Chinese delegation, can continue to work as hard as it did at being a host and at being a participant, then I'm sure we can continue to make progress.

I was watching the Chinese festival the other night at the Kennedy Center and one of those acrobats up there balancing six different bowls on top of his head. All I could think of was my counterpart, Wu Dawei, with six different things on top of his head all of the time. So it's a tough issue.

With respect to contacts with the DPRK, we have had contacts with the DPRK through the New York channel. We do this. I know there's a question about my own travel plans and I haven't made travel plans yet. But I don't think contacts should be really that taken as the real issue here. I think it's not that we meet; it's what we say and what we agree on when we do meet.

So I think we will continue to have contacts and I would look for, in the coming weeks, to see an intensified diplomatic round. I mean, if I can say in the first couple of weeks it's been kind of a bureaucratic round as we've been working internally, and I think as we get closer to the next session, the date for which has not been precisely set but we assume it will be in early November, I would look for a very intensified diplomatic calendar and I would look to have U.S.-DPRK contacts.

[ ...Intervening Text... ]

QUESTION: T.V. Parasuram, Press Trust of India. Just to clarify for people not directly involved. What are the dangers of a stalemate? Because in this world, you find so many problems and apparently no solutions. What are the (inaudible) and what are you doing?

AMBASSADOR HILL: Well, I think we have put a great deal of emphasis on finding a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue. It's an issue, which will not find its way toward a stability; it's an issue that will continue to cause problems and instability for the region. That is, if it's left alone, it won't just find some natural level and be okay.

So we need to stay with it and we need to find a solution. Our belief is that the way to do this is not to just engage on a bilateral basis but rather engage all the countries in the region. And we have been doing that with China having an important interest in the DPRK, playing the host to this process.

So I have said before and I'll say again, we have a lot of options for dealing with it. Diplomatic is obviously the best option. But the one option we don't have is to walk away. We have to stay with it and we have to find a solution. And I very much would like to find a solution because I think it could really open the way to making -- to really helping Northeast Asia realize its potential. And I think Northeast Asia has shown an extraordinary economic potential, in fact, economic achievement. But it has not shown the achievement it should have, the potential it should have in terms of having the countries work together and creating a sort of regional structures, overcoming historical issues and the like.

So I hope that in addition to solving this terrible problem of nuclear weapons, a problem which really should not exist at this time in history. But in addition to solving this problem, I hope it will open the way to addressing broader issues. And in the final analysis, the six-party process will be what brought the U.S. closer to these countries, brought us closer to China, brought us closer to Japan and the others. So that I hope that if we handle this carefully and if we show some patience and really some stubbornness, if we stick with it and don't become weak but stay strong, I hope that this can help address one of the great tragedies of the 20th century, which was the very rude division of the Korean Peninsula. And I think that anybody who has been to Korea knows that the pain that everyone feels at having a line drawn right across that Peninsula.

So I hope that we can deal with the fact that Korea, for example, has only an armistice, a sort of elaborate ceasefire. It doesn't have yet a full peace mechanism. So we mentioned that in the Statement of Principles to try to push ahead on these issues. So it is very important that we succeed and I would argue that we have to succeed. And I can assure you that I'm going to do everything I can do to make it succeed.

[ ...Intervening Text... ]

(end text)

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