U.S. Relations with the People's Republic of China (2006)

U.S. Department of State

Interview With Jim Wooten of the Atlanta Journal Constitution

Secretary Condoleezza Rice
Washington, DC
October 30, 2006

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QUESTION: On another subject, on North Korea and nuclear weapons, you're just back from there last week. You were saying that the Chinese didn't confirm that Kim Jong-il had either apologized or said he would never do it again. Is there anything different since then?

SECRETARY RICE: No. The Chinese never said anything about an apology. I don't know what he may have said to them about their own relationship, but he certainly -- in nothing that they told me did he apologize for having tested, which is the way this question came up.

In terms of what he said about future tests, he did say he wasn't going to test immediately but he said it all depended on the -- you know, the international system -- or the international political climate and on whether U.S. hostile policies remained in place, which hardly sounds like a promise not to test again.

QUESTION: Right.

SECRETARY RICE: And so I don't think there was any contradiction there. The Chinese have since said that he didn't apologize and they've since said that he did say he had no immediate plans to test but it depended on the international system, which is exactly what I heard from them.

QUESTION: A couple of weeks ago, a week or so ago here, Jimmy Carter said that there was great merit in the negotiations that he did with North Korea in '94 and is of the opinion that two-party talks involving the U.S. and North Korea are desirable. This is a quote: "I think as far as North Korea is concerned, they would be willing, but I don't think there's a chance in the world that the U.S. Government would approve I or someone else to go negotiate with North Korea."

Is there a chance in the world and is there any value in involving outsiders?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, I don't think we really need outsiders. This is something -- look, we talk to people who talk to the North Koreans all the time from the outside and those are valuable voices. But look at where we are. The North Koreans have tested. But we have a coalition of states that's been working on this problem together now for a couple of years so that you have China, probably the most influential country with North Korea, signed on to Chapter 7 sanctions against North Korea that I think give some prospect that the North Koreans may feel enough pressure that they in fact come back in seriousness to the six-party talks ready to actually negotiate.

The reason we don't want bilateral negotiations is that we have been down that road. The '94 agreement, which was worth a try at the time, I think, was then violated by the North Koreans and they had no penalty to pay vis-?vis anybody except the United States because nobody else was party to that agreement. So this time, if we actually get an agreement, it's going to be -- the parties to it will be China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and the United States. That's a very much more powerful position.

But I really would like to debunk one myth: the idea that we don't talk to the North Koreans, even bilaterally within the context of six-party negotiations. You know, back in 2005 the Chinese said to us that the North Koreans wanted to talk to Chris Hill, would we do this in Beijing in order to get the six-party talks restarted. And Chris Hill had that dinner in Beijing, he and his North Korean counterpart. And then about six weeks later, the six-party talks began again. And so it's not that we have not talked to the North Koreans, and I wouldn't be surprised if we talk to them very often, but -- and by the way, inside the six-party talks Chris Hill had bilateral discussions with the Japanese, bilateral discussions with the South Koreans and bilateral discussions with the North Koreans.

So what we don't want to do is to get ourselves into a negotiation with the North Koreans where it's the United States and North Korea agreeing to something that the other states who have real leverage have no stake in. That's different than saying, "Should we talk to the North Koreans?" We do and we should.

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2006/1007

Released on November 6, 2006