U.S. Relations With the People's Republic of China (2007)

U.S. Department of State

Testimony Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Andrew Natsios, President's Special Envoy to Sudan

Washington, DC
February 8, 2007

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The U.S. is a major partner for aid, but not for trade. Unilateral economic sanctions are the central element in the U.S. economic policy toward Sudan. As a result, the United States has negligible trade with Sudan and minimal investment in the country. At the same time, Sudan has built stronger economic ties with China, India Malaysia and Gulf Arab states and substantial trade continues with Japan and Europe. In view of the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act (DPAA), the President's Executive Order 13412 modified the U.S. comprehensive sanctions regime against Sudan under Executive Order 13067, particularly by removing many restrictions with respect to Southern Sudan, as well as Darfur and the three areas, though Sudan as a whole, and specifically the Government of Sudan, is still subject to significant sanctions under U.S. law. Many within the GOS and GOSS believe that U.S. sanctions are detrimental to CPA progress.

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Due to the continued problems encountered in Darfur the United Nation's Security Council passed Resolution 1706 in August of last year, calling for a robust force of approximately 17,000 UN Peacekeeping troops and 3,000 police to take over the peacekeeping responsibilities from the AU. The Sudanese government rejected outright the idea of UN troops replacing AU troops in Darfur. It was only through broad, consistent and strong international pressure on Khartoum that we have seen an adjustment in their public position on these UN troops. We have been working very hard over the past several months with our international partners to sustain this pressure. I have made several visits to Sudan, and I have traveled to Chad, Egypt, China, Ethiopia, and European capitals to explain the U.S. policy towards Sudan and express U.S. support for the UN/AU process.

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In November, while the Sudanese and the international community were at a standstill over acceptance and implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1706, Kofi Annan invited the Sudanese government and a broad spectrum of international players-including the African Union, the Arab League, and the 5 Permanent Representatives to the UN Security Council (the U.S., France, the U.K., China and Russia) and the EU-to meet in Addis Ababa to discuss UNSCR 1706 and a potential compromise that would allow UN troops to be deployed on the ground to assist in peacekeeping. Mr. Annan took a very active and positive leadership role in negotiating and uniting the world around a plan to end the conflict and atrocities in Darfur. All parties in attendance in Addis, including the Sudanese Foreign Minister, agreed to a three-phase plan to allow the UN to support the AU troops initially with technical support and equipment, and ultimately with additional UN troops. Now called the Addis agreement, this way out of the deadlock over UNSCR 1706 calls for a hybrid UN/AU force of 20,000 troops and police. The force commander is to be an African, and jointly appointed by the UN and AU. A senior political leader in charge of the non-security mission including promotion of dialogue will also be appointed by both the UN and AU. The package would include UN funding of the entire force as well as UN operational command and control.

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In January I made a visit to China where I had positive meetings with several key officials, including China's highest-ranking foreign affairs official, State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan, and Assistant Foreign Ministers, Cui Tiankai and Zhai Jun. The Chinese have been largely supportive of our efforts to resolve the Darfur situation through peaceful means and have been publicly encouraging Khartoum to allow the UN/AU hybrid force as agreed to in Addis. We confirmed with them our position that our interests in Darfur are solely humanitarian and we have no economic or military interests behind our policies. We also made it clear that we are not pursuing regime change in Sudan unless the people vote for a new government in free and fair elections agreed to under the CPA framework. China's Ambassador to the UN Wang Guangya played a vital and constructive role in helping to broker the Addis compromise and has been active in subsequent Security Council deliberations designed to accelerate the introduction of the hybrid force into Darfur. Chinese President Hu Jintao just completed a visit to Khartoum, where he again encouraged Bashir to show flexibility and allow the UN/AU hybrid force to be deployed. I should emphasize, however, that while we welcome and encourage China's efforts to apply diplomatic pressure on the Government of Sudan, we will look to Beijing to join with the international community in applying more forceful measures, should Khartoum remain intransigent. China's substantial economic investment in Sudan gives it considerable potential leverage, and we have made clear to Beijing that the international community will expect China to be part of the solution.

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