U.S. Relations With the People's Republic of China (2009)

U.S. Department of State

Secretary Clinton's Interview with Kim Ghattas of BBC

Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State
Kazan, Russia
October 14, 2009

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QUESTION: Are you at all worried that the Russians are maybe stringing you along? Because they can play nice, they can hold out hope to you that they're going to go along with you on sanctions. But they know that the Chinese will do all the stalling that is needed for them on the sanctions when it comes to action at the Security Council.

SECRETARY CLINTON: I believe that this is a difficult process for both the Chinese and the Russians. Until relatively recently within the last months, I don't think they saw the threat the way that we and others saw it. We've been intensifying our cooperation, our sharing of information, our analysis of what could come more broadly were Iran to be successful.

And so I certainly see the Russians moving. Now, the Russians are more immediately affected. They are on --

QUESTION: And so they're more careful?

SECRETARY CLINTON: I think they are also more careful, but also perhaps more aware of the threats that we see coming from Iran because they're in proximity. China's a long way away. China's relationship with Iran is primarily commercial. But we're continuing to work and share information, and I think the fact that all of our P-5+1 partners have signed off on some very strong statements would not have happened without this kind of effort.

QUESTION: So you don't think that they're playing nice in the hope to have warmer relations with you and have, perhaps, concessions on certain issues? I'm not saying that the missile defense shield position was a concession, but it is something that they welcomed very, very much. So they're putting you in a position where you're more amenable to their demands.

SECRETARY CLINTON: I don't see it that way, Kim. I think that -- like, take missile defense. We made an assessment that the Iranian threat was different than what the Bush Administration thought it was. The Bush Administration's plan was really aimed at long-range missiles -- ICBMs, intercontinental ballistic missiles. Our assessment is that the Iranians have moved much faster on the short and medium-range missiles. So when we came up with what we call the phased, adaptive approach, it was really in response to how we see the threat.

So it was clear, as we explained it to the Russians, that this was something we did in our national security based on what we think is a better analysis. But I think the Russians see that if Iran poses a threat to the greater European region, to our forward-based troops in NATO, it's next door. So all of a sudden, it becomes more in their national security interest to cooperate with us and to really make their own assessments, which they're doing.

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