U.S. and Hong Kong (1998)

Asia-Pacific Security and China: A U.S. Pacific Command Perspective

Remarks prepared for delivery to Asia Society Hong Kong Center,
on 4 Dec 1998 by
Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, USN
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command

Good afternoon. Thank you for that kind introduction. I want to thank your Chairman, Mr. Ronnie Chan, for the invitation to speak here at the prestigious Asia Society Hong Kong Center today. This role the society plays as a gateway for increased understanding between Asia and the United States, as well as the rest of the world, is well known.

Today, my topic is U.S. Pacific Command's perspective on Asia-Pacific security. I will give a quick assessment of the region, through U.S. eyes, an overview of the U.S. military's role as well as our U.S. Pacific Command strategy in the Asia-Pacific. Finally, I would like to finish with our perspective on our relations with other nations in the region.

The Region

U.S. Pacific Command's home base is in Honolulu, Hawaii. Its assigned area of responsibility extends from the west coast of North America to the east coast of Africa and includes 43 nations. The Asia-Pacific region includes over half the world's surface, well over half its population, and when combined with the United States, over half the world's economy.

Over the course of the past year the Asia-Pacific region has seen considerable change. The backdrop for this change remains the continuing economic crisis that plagues much of the region. In addition there are recent developments on the Korean peninsula, tests of nuclear devices by India and Pakistan, and changes of government in the Philippines, Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and Japan. As a Pacific nation, America's economic, political and military interests in the Pacific are diverse and lasting. These interests drive our permanent and active involvement in the region...as partners with Asian nations.

The U.S. and Asia have become more interdependent as our trade has grown dramatically over the last generation. Trade with the region accounts for over $500 billion per year, approximately 35% of total U.S. trade, double our trade with Europe. Foreign direct investment is less but America's economic future remains merged with this region.

The region contains over 56 percent of the earth's population. Millions of American citizens living along or within the Pacific Rim add to its 65% of the world's total population. As we look to the future, solving any global problem will require that we work together with the people and governments of the Asia-Pacific.

Militarily, five of America's seven mutual defense treaties are with Asia-Pacific nations. The world's six largest militaries operate in the region. America has an enduring interest in ensuring that no hostile coalition arises in the Asia-Pacific. It is not in anyone's interest for any state, including the United States, to become a Pacific hegemon.

The Asia-Pacific region is generally at peace, but is not free from the possibility of major conflict. The U.S. has fought three major wars there in the last century and since 1950 the U.S. has lost more lives in Asia than in the rest of the world combined. Other than the United Nations and regional organizations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, there are no broader integrating regional institutions to reconcile conflicting ambitions. We must work together to such institutions for stability and security.

Each of these interests bind the U.S. to the Asia-Pacific and we are committed for the long term. Clearly the U.S. interest lies in a secure, stable and prosperous Asia-Pacific region.

The Framework

Pacific Command's mission is to promote peace, to deter aggression, to respond to crises and, if necessary, to fight and win in order to guarantee security and stability throughout the Asia-Pacific region.

Pacific Command is tasked to plan, coordinate and direct joint operations in peace, crisis and war. We strive to be an active player, partner and beneficiary to promote a secure, prosperous and democratic Asia-Pacific community. The word "partner" is key -- and relatively new. As we have moved from a Cold War posture to today, we are determined to work as partners with the other countries in the region.

Our military strategy derives from two fundamental premises. The first is that there is a merge of political, economic and military aspects of security. These aspects are interdependent and counterproductive to advance separately. Imagine three interlocking rings, if you will. Although the military tends to its ring, the Pacific Command must also operate at the center where the three rings overlap. Our task is to ensure the military piece advances in concert with the economic and political pieces.

To achieve this goal, we work very closely with our State Department and with the foreign ministries in other nations. Frequent calls with ambassadors and their country teams, to discuss regional issues -- political and economic as well as military, is a good example of this cooperation.

For example, we met recently in Singapore with the U.S. Chiefs of Mission for Southeast Asia, our ambassadors and consuls general, for the region. We also helped to host the most recent ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-sessional Group meeting on confidence building measures in Honolulu.

Our second premise is that security, especially military security, undergirds the stable conditions that are prerequisite for economic and political prosperity. In the words of Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, "security is the oxygen that fuels the economic engine of Asia." Military security does not cause economic or political growth, but such cannot occur without it.

Perhaps the best illustration of this premise comes from U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright who said, "Economic systems rest on political order, political order rests on military security." In the context of the current economic crisis, military security must help provide the stable conditions necessary for economic recovery to begin.

Our Strategy

The Pacific Command strategy is simple and consists of three parts: Preventive defense, crisis response, and the ability to fight and win a major conflict. At all levels, the concept of responsible forward presence is an essential element of our strategy--contributing directly to security and stability throughout the region.

The concept of preventive defense is similar to the concept of preventive medicine--the common goal is to avoid illness before it occurs. One component of preventive defense is peacetime engagement. In peacetime we focus on activities to build relationships which reassure the region of our commitment and deter conflict. Day-to-day these activities take many forms, including meetings, high-level visits, port calls, and multinational conferences such as those hosted by our Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu.

A good example is the recent Asia-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference we held in Hawaii. In the first meeting of its kind for our region, the top-ranking military officers from 14 nations gathered to discuss prospects for regional military cooperation as well as to keep our communications clear. Though the PLA was invited, the time was not yet right for participation. All of us hope the time will be right soon.

The second component of preventive defense is training and preparing our forces, along with those of our allies, for operations in crisis or conflict.

When specific events threaten to bring about crises or conflict, we are prepared to respond with credible and ready military forces to deter violence, reinforce diplomacy, and position critical capabilities should deterrence fail.

One example, both of preventive defense and crisis response, occurred in July 1997 when factional fighting broke out in Cambodia, endangering foreign citizens living there. After a call to the head of the Thai military, General Mongkon Ampornpisit, we were able to deploy a Joint Task Force to Thailand to prepare an evacuation. As it turned out, we didn't use the forces, but they gave our leaders and those of other nations confidence they were ready if needed.

Another example was earlier this year as rising political and economic tensions caused civil unrest and a change of government in Indonesia, many nations conducted precautionary evacuations of their citizens. If the situation had deteriorated further, an amphibious ready group was standing by to complete the evacuation; though this was not necessary. We are aware of your concern with the apparent repugnant treatment of Indonesian Chinese. This is also a great concern to us, and all responsible people, including General Wiranto, the commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces.

The last resort is our ability to fight and win. Should diplomatic efforts fail to deter conflict, we are prepared to fight and win quickly and decisively. We prefer to fight with the support of allies and coalition partners, but we will fight alone if necessary. The best example of this component of our strategy is the situation on the Korean peninsula where we believe our ready presence, in concert with the South Koreans and other allies, has maintained the peace for 45 years. Our capacity to fight and win enables us to focus on preventive defense day in and day out.

Our Forces

The U.S. Pacific Command has more than 300,000 military personnel from all our services: Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines. If needed, we can also call upon America's national assets. Our forward-deployed forces comprise approximately 100,000 personnel and military assets. This number symbolizes our commitment to the region. Even more important, however, is the powerful military capability this figure represents -- a capability that reassures the region and enables us to react to potential crises.

Our Focus--Key issues

Let me now briefly review U.S. Pacific Command's most important military security goals for the immediate future. First, Pacific Command is working steadily to preserve our vital security relationship with Japan. Second, we are building sound foundations for our growing relationship with China. Third, we continue to help provide a secure environment for a non-cataclysmic reconciliation on the Korean peninsula. Fourth, we are looking at ways to improve our military relationship with India for the future. Finally, Pacific Command, in concert with other branches of our government, is doing its part in providing security and stability to help our friends in Asia cope with the ongoing economic crisis.

With that backdrop, let's take a brief tour around the region. I'll offer our perspective on the security goals just mentioned as well as our views on relations with a few particular nations.

Japan

We believe our relationship with Japan, a staunch ally, is the pivotal security relationship in the Pacific and remains the linchpin for regional stability. This alliance is dedicated to the security of Japan and is not directed at any nation. We take seriously concerns about our alliance with Japan and work hard to maintain openness.

Japan's significant challenges include stabilizing their leadership transition and the continuing impact of the economic crisis in Asia. A more galvanizing issue for Japan is the threat to security posed by the North Korean ballistic missile and potential nuclear programs. While the U.S. and Japan examine options for dealing with this emerging challenge to security in the region, our forward presence in Japan and Korea continue to remain an essential guarantor of stability.

China

A secure and stable Asia is a goal that both China and the United States share. Likewise, an open, prosperous and responsible China that assumes a more active role in the region's affairs is also in the interests of the United States. That said, China's size, importance, and growing economic and military power make it the backdrop for discussions we have with all other nations in the region. To allay the concerns of neighboring nations, China should continue to increase its openness in security matters as it prepares to assume this more active role.

The Chinese leaders we meet, including Chief of the General Staff Gen. Fu Quanyou, Minister of Defense Gen. Chi Haotian, and even President Jiang Zemin, agree China faces the unique challenges of feeding, clothing, housing, employing and providing energy to 1.2 billion people -- a challenge of a magnitude few governments can contemplate.

We also recognize Taiwan is a core sovereignty issue for the Chinese people. The U.S. is committed to "One-China," as defined in the three joint communiqus and the Taiwan Relations Act. It is equally important for the Chinese people to recognize the U.S. will honor its commitment to peaceful resolution of Taiwan issues. We are encouraged by the recent resumption of cross-Strait dialogue during which Wang Daohan so ably represented China. We know that the Taiwan question can only be properly settled by Chinese people on both sides of the Strait, peacefully and over time.

We are equally encouraged by the low-key and relatively hands-off role Beijing has played in Hong Kong since the reversion. We are pleased that our interactions with Hong Kong continue with little change--especially the access and excellent support our Navy enjoys for port calls to the Fragrant Harbor. We believe that China and the rest of the world are well-served by Hong Kong's continuing role as a pivotal player in the economic future of the region.

U.S.-China relations can take several paths, from partnership to coexistence to competition. Our military and political relationship evolved, from a low point with no communication between our military leaders in March 1996, to where it is today good and improving at a steady pace. General Zhang Wannian described this relationship as a treasure, not easily won, but of great worth.

As part of the "constructive strategic partnership" called for by our two Presidents, U.S. Pacific Command aims to promote military-to-military ties that bring us closer. When President Jiang Zemin visited Honolulu in 1997, he remarked, "before there can be trust there must first be understanding." So first, we want to develop and increase understanding by moving our military relationship beyond the very senior policy, foreign affairs and protocol channels and into more routine operational channels.

Second, we want to continue expanding our contacts to bring younger, more-junior American and Chinese officers together. Our experiences with senior PLA officers are rewarding and have benefited both countries. We need younger officers to also have a dialogue for the future. Both sides agree on the benefits of this initiative.

China will choose her own path in determining if the next century is one of conflict or cooperation. Our common goals and interests far outweigh our differences. We remain optimistic that we can forge a relationship with China that will meet our mutual interests and work to the benefit of all nations of the world. It will come only with increased understanding and clear communication.

Korea

The Korean peninsula remains the region's most potentially volatile flashpoint. The recent missile launch and infiltration efforts point to the mercurial decision-making and unpredictable nature of the North Korean regime. While the likelihood of conflict may not be high, the consequences would be severe--so we and our ROK allies must remain prepared. Our immediate objectives for the peninsula--which I think we share with many nation in the region--include controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction as well as fostering a border with reduced tensions and more stable interaction between the North and the South.

Though weakened, the North Korean military still retains a dangerous lash-out capability. U.S. forces work closely with our South Korean allies to deter this possibility. Additionally, we are deeply concerned with the impact of the region's economic crisis on South Korea as well as North Korea's development of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.

We support President Kim Dae Jung's engagement policy with North Korea as well as Korean aspirations for reunification, beginning with a process of peaceful reconciliation. Reconciliation is a logical first step that can transform tension and threat into stability. The situation there could take several possible paths before a reunification of the two Koreas is realized. While the Korean people will determine the pace, reconciliation should proceed slowly, due to the costs and the cultural and economic differences that have grown up over the last fifty years.

Southeast Asia

Indonesia and Thailand, both of strategic importance in the region, have been the hardest hit by the current Asia financial crisis. Even in times of prosperity, governing Indonesia is a daunting task. With its large population, many languages, 17,508 islands, drought, and rising food prices, the potential for instability is high. Complicating current economic difficulties are the political questions posed by recent leadership changes. Indonesia's armed forces, ABRI, will continue to have an important role to play in the difficult days ahead.

Thailand, a key U.S. security partner in the region, also faces hard times. The U.S. government and U.S. Pacific Command continue to work with Thailand to ease the strain of the financial crisis. We have taken concrete steps to ease the financial burden of military programs, including reshaping the size, scope, and timing of military contacts, and looking for ways to reduce the impact of the crisis on security assistance programs. The Royal Thai armed forces have earned much deserved praise for their stabilizing role over the last year.

Singapore remains strong and steady in the region. Relatively less affected by the financial crisis, this city-state views the U.S. pragmatically. My sense is that Singapore's leaders view the U.S. as an honest broker in the region and recognize our contributions to world peace and stability.

India

India is a nation of vast economic, political and military potential and is an important player in the Asia-Pacific region and in the global community. It is also a nation with which we share a democratic form of government. India's and Pakistan's regrettable decisions to resume nuclear testing was a major setback to stability in South and East Asia. It put on hold our gradually improving military-to-military ties. Our immediate goals are to help reduce those tensions, restrain further missile and nuclear activity, and encourage a substantive India-Pakistan bilateral dialogue. We work closely on this with U.S. Central Command which has responsibility for Pakistan.

The Asia Economic Crisis

During the past year, the initial currency and banking crisis that affected certain countries has developed into a widespread economic crisis that encompasses much of the region. The effects of this crisis are now being felt in the United States and demonstrate our growing global interdependence. A potential source of additional friction among governments both inside and outside the region is the possibility of a future trade crisis as countries in financial difficulty try to export their way out of their predicament and thereby cause trade deficits to grow.

Returning to the first premise of our strategy, the military certainly has a role to play, in conjunction with political and economic entities, to ease the economic crisis. We are selectively scaling back our interactions in size and scope. We are reviewing all aspects of our engagement programs including exercises, high-level visits, education and training, and security assistance. The bottom line is that continuing economic decline in the region can have a decidedly negative impact on stability. This suggests that all of us must be watchful to keep communications clear and avoid military miscalculation.

The Future

Let me conclude by saying that as a Pacific nation, the United States remains committed to the vast and changing Asia-Pacific region for the long-term. Working in-step with our political and economic counterparts, U.S. Pacific Command's focus remains on providing military security. Our strategy of Preventive Defense, along with our readiness to respond to crisis or conflict, helps ensure the secure conditions that undergird regional stability.

As military professionals, we are "paid pessimists" and are expected to "keep our powder dry." However, this does prevent us from being optimists about the future of the Asia-Pacific. We remain convinced that by engaging in dialogue informed by mutual understanding and respect for each other's views, and by maintaining a position of strength, we can best contribute to peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.

Thank you for your attention.