U.S. and Hong Kong (2000)

Pacific Forces Commander March 7 on Asia-Pacific Security

Following is the text of Blair's remarks:

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STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL DENNIS C. BLAIR, U.S. NAVY COMMANDER IN CHIEF U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON FISCAL YEAR 2001
POSTURE STATEMENT 7 MARCH 2000

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and members of this Committee, on behalf of the men and women of the United States Pacific Command, thank you for this opportunity to present my perspective on security in the Asia-Pacific region. Having served as USCINCPAC for just over a year, I believe that steady and focused efforts are required to ensure the region develops in ways favorable to American interests. A secure and peaceful Asia-Pacific region presents tremendous opportunities for greater prosperity in America, and in the world, as we enter into this century.

Alternatively, an Asia poised for armed conflict, uncertain of the intentions of neighbors and regional powers, and subject to a rising wave of nationalism as a new generation of leaders comes to power, will present only crises and dangers. As the principal guarantor of global peace, the United States, by its actions and omissions, will strongly influence, if not determine, the outcome.

The economic, political, and military contours of the Asian landscape are evolving rapidly. Most Asian economies are now enjoying economic recovery. But one of the lessons learned from Asia's financial turbulence in 1997 and 1998 is that we cannot take Asia's economic prosperity for granted. A durable recovery and economic security in the region can only come when the financial and corporate restructuring process is complete. We also see reasons for economic concern in a number of key Asian countries. For instance, Japan remains trapped in slow growth.

China's economy is also struggling with weak demand and severe price deflation. We are hopeful Jakarta's promising new budget and the recent agreement with IMF will help President Wahid turn Indonesia's economy around. But this will be no easy task.

Similarly, fractious Indian politics make it difficult for Prime Minister Vajpayee's new Indian government to implement the kind of bold economic reforms needed to reduce high levels of poverty. Sustainable economic growth in the region is in the interest of all. It provides a favorable setting for diplomatic and military initiatives to build a security framework for the region.

There are many flash points in the region. Long-standing tensions threaten serious conflict in places such as Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and Kashmir. Violent separatist movements and ethnic disputes in Burma, China, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka set up vicious cycles of terrorism and repression within countries and threaten the region with refugee flows, export of terrorism, and crises between neighboring nations. Rapid economic development has created huge gaps in the distribution of wealth within many countries in the region. Combined with corruption and privilege, this development has caused citizens to challenge the legitimacy of ruling political regimes and has further inflamed violence between ethnic and religious groups.

Security relations among the states in the region are fluid. Fifty years after the end of World War II, the victory of Mao in China, and the beginning of independence from colonial rule, a new generation of national leaders is coming to power in Asia. Many of these leaders are reviewing the premises of their international security relations. Many bring a new nationalism based upon culture, ethnicity, and religion rather than anti-colonialism.

The teachings of Marx, Lenin, and Mao no longer guide the Chinese. India has turned its attentions outward and expects to play a greater role in international politics in the coming years. Indonesia is emerging from almost four decades of authoritarian rule. Globalization increases wealth, but often offends ethnic sensitivities. Balance of power and nationalism will compete against the more enlightened views of greater security and economic cooperation to drive the future of Asia.

The role the United States plays is critical to the future of Asia. In the 20th century, America fought three major wars and lost more lives in Asia than in any other theater of conflict.

We need to do better in the 21st century.

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EVENTS THAT SHAPED THE REGION OVER THE PAST YEAR

Since I last testified to you, numerous events have shaped security developments in the region. Let me begin with a key ally, Japan.

Japan

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North and South Korea President Kim Dae-jung's forward-looking, visionary approach exemplifies a clear path to regional security. While unwavering in his commitment to deter North Korean aggression, President Kim has reached out to current and historical enemies to build a more secure future for Korea. He strongly supported U.S. efforts led by Dr. Perry and shares responsibility for successful trilateral consultations. His government has increased security dialogue and cooperation with Japan and high level defense-related visits with China. Under President Kim's leadership, Korea is coming to peace with the past in the expectation of a more prosperous future. Recognizing the obligation of all nations to contribute to collective security, his government provided substantial forces to peace operations in East Timor.

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China

Since I testified last year, a confluence of events drove U.S.-China military relations to a new low. The Cox Commission Report, investigations of Chinese efforts to influence the U.S. domestic political arena, and analyses of the military balance across the Taiwan Strait captured headlines early in the year.

They were quickly followed by China's crackdown on Falun Gong followers and Prime Minister Zhu Rongji's failed efforts during his U.S. visit to reach a World Trade Organization agreement.

In May, relations reached their nadir with the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the resultant severing by China of military contacts between our two countries. Finally, in July Taiwan's President Lee further exacerbated both cross-strait and Sino-U.S. relations with his "state-to-state" formulation.

These events clearly challenged China's leadership as it wrestled with a strategy for balancing internal stability and the Taiwan issue with the need for outside investment and trade.

China's leaders now appear to have adopted a strategy of opening and marketizing its economy -- and maintaining good relations with the U.S., while continuing to suppress internal dissent and pressuring Taiwan. Military relations are slowly mending. The U.S. has negotiated a settlement regarding Chinese lives lost in Belgrade and the damage to our respective diplomatic properties; a solid agreement was reached as a step towards entry into the WTO; the STENNIS battlegroup recently visited Hong Kong without incident; and, I have just returned from a useful trip to China where we exchanged views on security developments in Asia and discussed future interactions between our armed forces.

From a military perspective, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has made significant structural and organizational changes in all branches of service this last year. It has made noticeable increases, however, in the military capabilities of its Air Force, its Navy, and its rocket forces. These capability changes included increasing combat aircraft inventory, fielding fighter-bomber aircraft, and improving air defenses across the Taiwan Strait. Changes in the PLA Navy (PLAN), PLA missile force, and PLA ground forces focused on improving future capabilities. The PLAN continued sea trials for eventual fielding of additional surface and subsurface ships, continued testing of anti-ship missiles, improved naval helicopter training, and received the first of two Russian destroyers. The PLA missile force continued testing and fielding newer inter-continental and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) and is building additional SRBM launch sites, while the PLA ground force continued downsizing to both reduce its force structure and increase mobility.

The Taiwan military also made significant changes during the last year. The Taiwan Air Force increased its combat aircraft and surface-to-air missile inventories. Once assimilated, these systems should improve the island's air-to-air, anti-ship, and air defense capabilities. The acquisition of two KNOX-class frigates and the commissioning of additional coastal patrol boats should also improve future naval capabilities. The only significant change in the Taiwan army was downsizing some divisions into combined arms brigades.

These changes in PLA and Taiwan military forces did not significantly alter the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan's military maintains a qualitative edge over the PLA, and its combat capabilities should improve steadily over time as it incorporates new weapons into its warfighting doctrine and training. The PLA still lacks the capability to invade and control Taiwan. It maintains a quantitative edge in all branches of service, but does not have an adequate power projection capability to quickly overcome Taiwan's more modern air force and inherent geographical advantages, which favor the defense. It does, however, have the ability to inflict significant damage to Taiwan with its military forces.

We expect China to accelerate its pace of military modernization somewhat by increasing the PLA budget over the next several years. However, this will not decisively alter the military situation across the Strait within that time. Indonesia and East Timor Events in Indonesia and East Timor have also been a focus of our attention over the past year. The national elections in June, the first free elections in over 40 years, were conducted in a peaceful atmosphere, surprising many observers and giving renewed hope to a democratic process for Indonesia. Fear of violence and danger to foreign residents of Indonesia proved unfounded. However, events in East Timor kept Pacific Command, in conjunction with our regional allies and security partners, busy planning for a wide variety of possible contingencies.

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South Asia Relations between India and Pakistan, which generally deteriorated over the year, drive security in South Asia. India also has significant though less immediate concerns about China.

Shortly following promising reconciliation talks at Lahore, Pakistan, fierce fighting erupted along the line-of-control in Kashmir. The subsequent military coup in Pakistan and hijacking of an Indian Airlines flight on Christmas Eve further heated the rhetoric and dangerously strained relations between the two countries. Meanwhile, there is great and potentially dangerous uncertainty about the nuclear programs and policies of both countries. I visited India earlier this year, the first USCINCPAC visit since 1997. Overall, my discussions with Indian leaders were very constructive; they expressed interest in gradually increasing security cooperation with us, initially to counter terrorism and illegal drugs. Once India responds to our nonproliferation concerns, I believe that a gradual strengthening of military interaction is in the interests of both countries. Both of us have many common international interests, and the more we work with India the better we can defuse tensions by supporting productive relations between that country and Pakistan.

Elsewhere in south Asia, violence continued unabated in Sri Lanka as the Tamil separatists launched suicide bombings against government officials and achieved military successes. Nepal faces a smaller scale insurgency in remote valleys. Neither Sri Lanka nor Nepal has yet fashioned the right combination of negotiations, economic development, and military/ police operations to turn the tide of these insurgencies.

Smaller South Asian nations such as Nepal and Bangladesh have a proud and distinguished tradition of participation in U. N. peacekeeping operations (PKO). Pacific Command provides some support for these capabilities. U.S. forces participated in a very successful multi-platoon training exercise designed to improve peacekeeping skills. Commander U.S. Army Pacific sponsored the event and the Royal Nepalese Army hosted the nations involved. In addition to the U.S. and Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka contributed platoons and 18 other nations, including India and China, sent observers.

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China. The US has important interests in all corners of Asia, as does China by virtue of its central geography. The pressing question is how China will approach security issues in the region.

There are both hopes and fears in the region over China's future development. China's leaders threaten force should Taiwan authorities declare independence, or violate other conditions they have stipulated, using the justification that this is an internal matter and interference is a violation of their sovereignty. Chinese authorities have also claimed sovereignty over the South China Sea. The resulting uncertainty over Chinese intention of using force to resolve territorial claims creates concerns throughout the Asia-Pacific region.

The past year has seen a mixture of contradictory words and actions from China. On the positive side:

-- No new military moves in the South China Seas and participation in discussions over a Code of Conduct for the area.

-- General respect for Hong Kong's autonomy.

-- Restrained actions in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait following President Lee Teng-hui's remarks regarding "state-to-state" relations.

On the negative side:

-- Continued military presence to dissuade other claimants, especially the Philippines, from construction in the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal.

-- Vociferous rhetoric in response to President Lee Teng-hui's statements, including veiled threats of attack and invasion.

A major objective of our engagement program with China is to develop areas where it can play a constructive, responsible role in promoting security and peaceful development in the region, rather than approaching the region through zero-sum, balance of power policies.

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APPENDIX A

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) is a regional studies, conference, and research center located in Honolulu. Established in September 1995 as a preventive defense and confidence-building measure, its mission is to enhance cooperation and build relationships through mutual understanding and study of comprehensive security issues among military and civilian representatives of the U.S. and other Asia-Pacific nations. The cornerstone of the Center's program is the College of Security Studies, which provides a forum where future military and government civilian leaders from the region can explore pressing security issues at the national policy level within a multilateral setting of mutual respect and transparency to build trust and encourage openness. Central to the College's effectiveness is the relationships forged between participants that bridge cultures and nationalities. Full and unobstructed participation by all nations in the region, to include such countries as Indonesia and Cambodia, is essential to achieving this. Complementing the College is a robust conference and seminar program that brings together current leaders from the region to examine topical regional security concerns, including peacekeeping, arms proliferation and the role of nuclear weapons in the region, and energy and water security.

The Center directly serves to further our regional engagement goals in several ways. First, it serves as a resource for identifying and communicating emerging regional security issues, within the constraints of non-attribution.

Secondly, the Center functions as an extremely effective "unofficial" engagement tool to continue critical dialogue in cases where official mil-to-mil relations are curtailed. Recent conferences and regional travel involving contact with or participation by prominent representatives from China highlight this role. Additionally, the Center frequently coordinates or hosts conferences addressing topical issues of interest to the U.S. Pacific Command or the region. Finally, the Center serves as a forum for articulating U.S. defense policy to representatives from the region. Passage of pending legislation is crucial to the continued success of the Center, by allowing certain expenses to be waived as an incentive for participation, and by expanding authority to accept domestic as well as foreign donations to help defray costs.

Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Since its beginning in 1994, the Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance has bridged the gap between civil and military activities related to humanitarian emergencies. Collaborating the resources and strengths of governmental and non-governmental organizations, the Center of Excellence has helped bring order to chaos following floods in Vietnam and Venezuela, earthquakes in Turkey and Taiwan, and population displacement in Kosovo and East Timor. The Center's unbiased approach to response, education and training, research, and consulting for disasters has become the model for successful interaction between the military and private humanitarian organizations. I urge the committee to continue supporting this important contributor to regional and international security.

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