U.S. and Hong Kong (2009)

Bureau of Industry and Security
U.S. Department of Commerce

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Tuesday, April 14th, 2009
www.bis.doc.gov

BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY
Eugene Cottilli
202-482-2721

Six Parties Added to Temporary Denial Order Barring Re-Export of Attack Boat for Iranian Military

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- The U.S. Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added six parties to a Temporary Denial Order (TDO) issued to halt the re-export of a powerboat for use by the Iranian Navy.

The TDO, which named the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and Tadbir Sanaat Sharif Technology Development Center (TSS), both based in Tehran, Iran, and Icarus Marine Pty. Ltd., of South Africa as Denied Persons, was issued based upon evidence that those parties were about to violate the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by re-exporting a Bladerunner 51 powerboat, the "Bradstone Challenger," to TSS for intended use by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy.

This Order makes the TDO applicable to six additional parties, all related to one of the Denied Persons by ownership, control, affiliation or position of responsibility. BIS added two IRISL officials, Ghasem Nabipour of Hong Kong and Iran, and Ahmad Sarkandi of Hong Kong, Iran and England, and Starry Shine International Limited of Hong Kong, as related parties to IRISL. These parties were added after BIS presented evidence that IRISL and Starry Shine, an entity co-directed by Napibour and Sarkandi, had engaged in a pattern of evasive conduct, which included the subsequent renaming of the vessel used to transport the Bladerunner 51 powerboat to Iran. BIS also added three parties as related persons to Icarus Marine Pty. Ltd. of South Africa: Shawn Hugo de Villiers of South Africa, Gunther Migeotte of Norway and South Africa and Icarus Design, AS of Norway, based on their relationship with Icarus Marine and that entity's involvement with the re-export.

Under the Order, which is effective upon publication in the Federal Register, these six parties may not directly or indirectly participate in, or benefit in any way from, any transaction subject to the EAR for the remaining duration of the TDO expiring on July 22, 2009. It is also a violation of the EAR for any person to participate in a transaction subject to the EAR involving a Denied Person, including any of these six related persons, while the TDO is in effect.

The high-performance powerboat the subject of the TDO has U.S.-origin engines and other components, and can reportedly reach speeds of up to 65 knots. BIS has significant concerns that it will be used by the IRGC Navy as a fast attack craft. According to published reports, similar vessels have been armed with torpedoes, rocket launchers, and anti-ship missiles.

IRGC, IRISL and IRISL's entire fleet are listed as Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) by the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control in Appendix A to 31 C.F.R. Chapter V, pursuant to Executive Order 13382. The designation identifies those parties determined to be weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their supporters. The unlicensed export or re-export of an item subject to the EAR to any person or vessel designated as an SDN pursuant to Executive Order 13382 is a violation of the EAR.

BACKGROUND

BIS controls exports and re-exports of dual-use commodities, technology and software for reasons of national security, missile technology, nuclear non-proliferation, chemical and biological non-proliferation, crime control and regional stability. Criminal and administrative sanctions can be imposed for violations of the EAR. For more information, please visit www.bis.doc.gov.

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