U.S. and Hong Kong (2003)

State Department Briefing Transcript

State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher conducted the department's daily press briefing April 25. Following is the State Department
transcript:

(begin transcript)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
FRIDAY, APRIL 25, 2003

BRIEFER: Richard Boucher, Spokesman

[ ...Intervening Text... ]

QUESTION: Could you give us your summation of the Beijing talks, now that they're over?

MR. BOUCHER: There we go. As you know, we've concluded our discussions in Beijing in a multilateral forum with the North Koreans. Had three days of meetings: first day, trilateral meetings; second day was separate meetings with the Chinese; the third day, there was a very brief and informal trilateral meeting, on Friday, this morning. And then this afternoon in Beijing he -- Assistant Secretary Kelly went on to Seoul, where he is now consulting and briefing South Korean officials; and then tomorrow, Saturday, he will be in Tokyo doing the same, consulting and briefing, with Japanese officials.

I think, in sum, I would say the talks were useful and that they fulfilled our purpose. As the President and the Secretary have both said, we heard a lot of things. We're not going to allow ourselves to be intimidated or blackmailed by threats. But our goal in this endeavor, in these meetings, was to go out, to say what we had to say, tell the North Koreans very clearly that they needed to verifiably and irreversibly end their nuclear weapons programs. The second goal was to listen and hear what they had to say, and the third goal was to hear what the Chinese had to say. And I think it was very clear to us, and we appreciate very much, that the Chinese were a significant participant in these discussions. The Chinese Government expressed clearly their views on the denuclearization of the peninsula, as it was agreed between the two Korean parties in 1992.

We heard a lot of things. We also said a lot of things. So, at this juncture, as the Secretary mentioned yesterday, it's important that North Korea think carefully about what they heard from us, about what they heard from China, and about what they're hearing from the international community and the President and the Secretary of State.

We also listened carefully to what they had to say. Assistant Secretary Kelly will come back with his delegation and will meet with senior officials back here in Washington, and we will analyze carefully what was said and discuss it and decide, at that point, what we think the next steps should be.

QUESTION: The North Korean media says that the North Koreans in Beijing presented "a new bold proposal to clear up its bilateral concerns."

MR. BOUCHER: Let me say a couple things about that. First, as the Secretary mentioned yesterday, the North Koreans did speak of a proposal. Whether it's new and bold, I think I would leave to further analysis by -- with our team when they get back.

We have made clear, though, again and again, that we don't think the intention of going to Beijing was, first of all, not to negotiate, not to try to move the ball forward in that sense, but to say what we had to say, hear what we expected to hear, and see the Chinese participate.

The question of proposals, though, I mean, we get back to the fundamental issue that we are not going to give a quid pro quo to get rid of a nuclear weapons program that never should have existed in the first place, to get rid of a nuclear weapons program that North Korea disavowed, promised they wouldn't have, numerous times to numerous parties throughout the 1990s and into this year.

So we'll look at what they've said. We'll analyze what they've said. But I think I have to repeat our basic position, as well.

All questions answered. Let's go. Ma'am.

QUESTION: North Korea demand United States to assure over their allegiance which is, in turn, it could (inaudible) to allow (inaudible) by North Korea. What is your comment?

MR. BOUCHER: My comment is that, number one, I'm not going to pretend to convey to you what the North Koreans said, and therefore I'm not able to confirm that they said -- whether they did or did not say what you say they say. So I'm just not in a position to comment on things that I can't -- that I don't know that were said.

QUESTION: Then the North Korea complain to the United States, they say the --

MR. BOUCHER: Once again, you're asking me a question about what North Korea said, and I'm not here to repeat what they said or to speak on their behalf.

Terri.

QUESTION: Was there any agreement at the end today that there would be further talks?

MR. BOUCHER: I know there are several of the parties, the Chinese especially, who would like to see further talks and who have talked about that. We have made clear, and I think our delegation made clear in Beijing, that for us that we had not decided on further discussions; that we would come back, we would analyze everything that happened and was said, and then we would decide back here on whether there should be further talks. So everybody is going back to consult with their capitals, I think I'd have to say.

QUESTION: Richard, you said several of the parties, especially the Chinese, want further talks with the three parties. You say you haven't decided. The Chinese want to. Are you implying the North Koreans expressed --

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know what they said. Frankly, I don't know if they did or not. But maybe "several" is the wrong word. One or more of the parties may be interested in further talks. At this point, we have not decided yet.

QUESTION: Does that mean, Richard, that you guys are -- that there may be consideration of no new talks?

MR. BOUCHER: As I said, we're going to analyze what was said, we're doing to discuss it back here, and then we'll decide. We just have not decided at this point to go forward with further talks.

QUESTION: The President's idea that he wants to deal with this diplomatically is still --

MR. BOUCHER: Oh, absolutely. And the President -- you know, the President has talked many times about trying to reach a peaceful and diplomatic solution. I think Secretary Rumsfeld just did. The President did in his interview with Tom Brokaw.

The President also made clear that there were other steps that we were going to take to strengthen nonproliferation regimes and other actions internationally so that this kind of situation can't arise.

QUESTION: Can we move on?

MR. BOUCHER: I think we have more here.

QUESTION: Sorry. Go ahead.

QUESTION: You say they were short. Yesterday's meeting was a very brief bi- or trilateral parties. Could you clarify it more on the -- could you outline the meeting, how you say they're just brief. So I need more -- I just want to hear the details, if you can. (Laughter.)

MR. BOUCHER: Very brief. It was a -- it was not a substantive discussion. It was a kind of a quick, a closing to the events. QUESTION: Yesterday?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, you mean yesterday in Asia. Friday's meeting. Friday's meeting is what we're talking about. I think that's where we are.

QUESTION: You say -- did they show any intention to make a concession or a change?

MR. BOUCHER: No, it was not a substantive discussion or a forum for discussion or agreement on anything. It was sort of a meeting at the end of the series of discussions that had been held, just kind of close it off.

Sir.

QUESTION: Did the U.S. ask that the Japanese and the South Korean inclusion, involvement?

MR. BOUCHER: Did we urge that?

QUESTION: Yes.

MR. BOUCHER: Oh, yes, we did, repeatedly. I think I made clear, have made clear before and will make clear again, the two major points that we raised, indeed the ones that we emphasized again and again, were, first of all, that North Korea needs to get rid of these nuclear weapons programs for it to expect any progress in relationships, not only with us but with others in the world; and then second of all, that Japan and South Korea belong in these talks, they have something to contribute, both in terms of their interests and their abilities; and therefore, we felt it was important for North Korea to accept that, recognize that, and for that to take place in the future.

QUESTION: What is their reaction?

MR. BOUCHER: Once again, I'm not going to try to speak for them.

Terri.

QUESTION: Would you say that the situation, the tension over the North Korean nuclear issue, is any different after these meetings than before, just by the fact that people are in the same room and you, at one point, spoke with each other and laid out your points? Even if the North Koreans were pretty aggressive, did it serve to deescalate at all?

MR. BOUCHER: The question of the tension has really been based on North Korean actions. It's been North Korean actions to develop a uranium enrichment program, North Korean actions to break the seals and kick out the International Atomic Energy inspectors, North Korean actions to try to withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty. It's really been a series of North Korean actions that have raised the tensions. Just the fact of seeing each other and talking doesn't change those actions and we still have to deal with those actions.

QUESTION: So was it all for nothing?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't want to quite, you know -- I don't want to say these talks did nothing. The talks were useful. I told you the purpose we had going out. I think you can see that they fulfilled those purposes. But no, I don't think anyone would expect that an initial meeting like this, where people said what they had to say, would deescalate or defuse the tension.

QUESTION: It seems that the tensions -- well, North Korea came out with a statement yesterday that said that, due to U.S. actions, this could trigger a war on the peninsula at any moment. Are you just seeing this as just more bluster by the North Koreans, or --

MR. BOUCHER: I think you'll probably find that that's the kind of statement that North Korea makes on a fairly frequent basis in one way or the other. It's certainly not a helpful attitude for them to have. It's not a helpful statement for them to make. But I'm not sure it was really timed to these talks. I don't know that it was commentary on what's taken place in Beijing over the last couple of days.

QUESTION: One more?

MR. BOUCHER: One more. George. Probably two more, actually.

QUESTION: Did I hear you correctly yesterday when you said you're going to go over the original Korean to make sure that the English translation that Kelly and the delegation heard was accurate? Is that going to happen?

MR. BOUCHER: Yes. We always -- every time we analyze one of these things, we analyze the Korean and the English and the translation and who the translator was. We look very carefully at what was said to make sure we understand the true intent.

QUESTION: Does that happen only with the Korean language, or other languages as well?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm told it happens a little more often with Korean. I'm not an expert, but that there are sometimes intricacies to the language that need to be looked at very carefully.

QUESTION: I have the same question about nuances, but I didn't ask it because my impression was when you said we'll analyze after Kelly comes home that this is still something to be done. Has it been done over the last 24 hours?

MR. BOUCHER: No. We'll talk with our delegation, with the interpreters, with people who were on the delegation who speak Korean. And that will all be part of the mix as we sit down with everybody and decide what -- analyze what happened, draw our conclusions, and decide what's next.

Sir.

QUESTION: Yes. Did Mr. Kelly talk on the issue of KEDO? If so, what did he say?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not going to get into any particular details at this point. My understanding, basic understanding, is that he emphasized again and again the points about the need to verifiably and irreversibly end North Korea's nuclear weapons program, and, second of all, for Japan and South Korea to participate.

Sir.

QUESTION: A general question. I'm sure that the American diplomats take note during initiation, or the talk, in the talk. But what about the informal lunchtime discussion with the partners?

MR. BOUCHER: We keep good track of everything that's said in these kind of discussions.

QUESTION: What about this time in Beijing?

MR. BOUCHER: We kept good track of everything that was said during these discussions.

Joel.

QUESTION: Richard --

MR. BOUCHER: Almost, Barry. I assume the same talk.

QUESTION: Okay. When you left the talks in Beijing, did you leave them with the North Koreans frustrated, where they might want to use bravado, and are you relying on the Chinese or others to help batten that down?

MR. BOUCHER: I would never try to characterize North Korean emotions upon leaving anything. It's not my position to try.

[ ...Intervening Text... ]

QUESTION: Richard, China -- France, it's reported, has invited China to join in some of the talks of the G-8. Do you favor that? Would you like to see them included --

MR. BOUCHER: I saw the report. It just came too late for me to check. I really don't know what our position is on that.

[ ...Intervening Text... ]

QUESTION: While our visiting team were at the talks in Beijing, the SARS epidemic appears to be getting out of hand. Were you asked by both China and other governments -- you've been issuing travel warnings -- to help rectify and do further research? Were you asked --

MR. BOUCHER: Most of our travel warnings, as you note, repeat the advice that the Center for Disease Control is giving. And indeed, the Center for Disease Control, from the very beginning, worked very, very closely with health authorities in other countries, in Hong Kong, in I think Vietnam, China, elsewhere, wherever they could, as well as with the international health authorities that we have obviously a very, very close relationship in that regard with Canada. So, but we generally, as far as the State Department goes when it comes to travelers, we're repeating the advice of qualified personnel.

QUESTION: And was the World Health Organization justified in their clampdown, especially Mayor Lastman of Toronto --

MR. BOUCHER: That's a question you'll have to ask the medical authorities.

(The briefing was concluded at 2:15 p.m.)

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