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U.S. and Macau (2006)

U.S. Department of State

On-the-Record Briefing -- 61st UN General Assembly

Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Waldorf-Astoria
New York, New York
September 21, 2006

(10:35 p.m. EDT)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, we had 85 people at this. We just had a meeting of what - sort of a broader group on the - to discuss Northeast Asian security, what became known in Kuala Lumpur as the 5+5.

QUESTION: Can you give us a list of who got in (inaudible)?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Right. It was - but it turned out to be the 6-1+2+3-2. (Laughter.) And I'll identify them. The U.S., Australia, Indonesia, New Zealand, Canada, the Philippines as the ASEAN chair, and the Republic of Korea. Does that come to eight?

QUESTION: So China and Russia didn't attend?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: China and Russia didn't attend. They are both Perm 5 members. They've been meeting with the Secretary all week. They didn't attend. They didn't say it was for policy reasons. It could have been for scheduling. But since it was an informal gathering we weren't really insisting that everybody be around the table.

We discussed - it was an information exchange. Ban Ki-moon discussed ROK assessments of the situation in North Korea, including the humanitarian situation. He also discussed the ROK's views of the need to get the six-party process going. Generally there was a discussion of the six-party process and I also updated some of the - I also updated the participants on the Macao situation, the banking issue which the North Koreans have used as a pretext for staying away from the talks for one year.

There was also a good discussion of the need to implement 1695 and Australia and Japan updated us on where they have - what they have done recently in terms of taking measures pursuant to their obligations under 1695.

And we also discussed some of the broader issues of the need to develop stronger security mechanisms in Northeast Asia. And at the conclusion of the meeting, Secretary Rice, as she did in Kuala Lumpur, suggested that she thought this was a useful exchange of views, very informal, most people did not speak with notes, and thought that perhaps we could get together in a similar forum in the next time we're all together, which is in Hanoi during APEC.

All participants, and starting with Secretary Rice, were at pains to make clear that we're not trying to substitute the six-party process, that we're not in any way trying to change that. It's not designed to be a substitute. It's simply an informal forum whose purpose is to discuss the security situation in Northeast Asia and to support the six-party process. And I would say all participants were very strong in their support of the six-party process.

QUESTION: Are you disappointed that China and Russia decided not to attend because it gives the meeting less gravitas? Their attendance, I'm sure, would have been welcome.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, again, the point of the meeting is not to create some new mechanism. It's to have an exchange of views. We had only one hour for the meeting so the idea is to be very inclusive. Anyone who really wants to attend or who has a role in Northeast Asian security should be able to attend, but if people are not able to attend it really doesn't affect, as you put it, the gravitas of the meeting.

QUESTION: Do you see it as a snub at all?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No, I did not. Sorry, I can't help you with that one. (Laughter.) I can see where you're heading with that. That would be a very - that would really not - you know, the Secretary has seen China and Russia throughout the week. I mean, breakfast, lunch and dinner. I mean, we kind of know where they are on these issues.

It was a good opportunity to hear Ban Ki-moon, for example, give his take on the food situation in North Korea, a good opportunity to hear from some countries that have an interest but often don't express it as much, for example the Canadian Government. I hope the New York Times is not here. No.

QUESTION: Do you think that China is doing enough to (inaudible)?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Several participants, several participants - I won't name them - several participants commented that they thought China should be doing more.

QUESTION: And you generally --

QUESTION: Was the United States one?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: We did not make that point in the information exchange but several participants did.

[ ...Intervening Text... ]

QUESTION: The concern that China didn't attend the meetings comes from the fact that Secretary Rice and various officials say that China's participation is important?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, China's participation in the six-party process is important. I mean, it's essential --

QUESTION: No, I'm just referring to this meeting.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: You know, we value our interaction with China on security issues in Northeast Asia. They have a lot to say. But I can assure you the Secretary has been talking to the Chinese all week about various security issues, not only in Northeast Asia. So there is no lack of communication with the Chinese.

For me it was very useful to hear from some other players that we don't hear as much from on these issues. Canada, for example, was a very - Minister MacKay made some very good points about what Canada is doing. In fact, Canada even has a bilateral process with the North Koreans. So it was a very good opportunity to exchange views on it.

[ ...Intervening Text... ]

QUESTION: I have two questions. First, just to clarify, when they said these countries, the main countries - that China needs to do more, China needs to do more to get North Korea back to the talks? Was that what you meant?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Yes, yes.

QUESTION: Okay. Secondly, I'm sorry if I missed --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: This is not an original thought too. I mean, many people are --

QUESTION: Right. I just didn't know if it was something meatier than that.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No, no, it was a general comment made by several participants, but someone asked me if we had made that comment and we did not do that.

QUESTION: So anything - I'm sorry if I missed it at the top because I was late, but can you talk at all about the Thailand situation and give us your sense of that right now?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I can do that, but let's just finish with this Northeast Asia thing.

Nick.

QUESTION: Just quickly, Chris, on Macao. What did you tell them about (inaudible) and what kind of questions did they have to follow up, (inaudible) to connect the dots between what North Korea says and what you say?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think the purpose in discussing Macao was to just bring everyone up to speed on how - on what the events actually were. It was a longstanding investigation and it had gone on for a couple of years. The announcement of the Section 311 Patriot Act, the Treasury announcement that came in September '05 was not meant in any way to coincide with the negotiations in Beijing, but - and it represented the culmination of a couple of years of negotiations. I don't think it's anything you don't know already, Nick.

I explained, you know, the number of bank accounts that are probably involved, some 40 accounts. I explained the total amount of money that's probably involved, some $24 million. I explained what we have offered to do to address this. We've offered the North Koreans that if, you know, when they come back to the six-party talks, we would - we could create some bilateral working group to deal with some of these financial matters. Or we could continue the dialogue that we had in New York last spring where we had some Treasury experts and their experts.

You know, they have said on many occasion they're not interested in money laundering and that they are - would like to, you know, convince us that they don't have it, that this isn't going on in their country. And so we have welcomed their giving us some details on that, so I explained that to the group.

QUESTION: Yesterday or earlier today, I think the ambassador in South Korea, the U.S. Ambassador said that you'd be willing to travel to the bilateral (inaudible)?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I was - I saw the comment, yeah.

QUESTION: And?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I don't have any further comment on it. I think he was - may have been misquoted.

Yes, Ann.

QUESTION: Back on Macao, did any of the other participants at today's meeting suggest that U.S. should drop it or back off or anything (inaudible)?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No, no, no, not after my coach and explanation of it. No, that's off the record, no. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: You urged them to --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: What we did was we --

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No, we talked about the need for all countries to implement 1695, the importance that these Security Council resolutions - that they be followed, so -

Yes, Guy.

[ ...Intervening Text... ]

QUESTION: I'm sorry. Do you plan to invite China and Russia again (inaudible)?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Of course, yeah. Of course and, you know, we hope they can come.

QUESTION: They were invited. They just didn't come, right?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Oh, they were invited. They just couldn't come, yeah.

[ ...Intervening Text... ]

QUESTION: Just before you get to Thailand, if you could just - I mean, where do things stand in your understanding after coming back from the region.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Oh sure, yeah. Well, yeah, I got back about a week ago. I visited Japan, China and South Korea and of course a couple of days later after I returned President Roh Moo-hyun was in Washington from South Korea. Right now, sadly, I don't think there has been much developments. All five participants are ready to start at any time. The North Koreans are not prepared to start. They are maintaining their position that the action against the - our action against Banco Delta Asia was for them tantamount to a sanction against their country and therefore they are not going to attend the talks. We have - until what they describe as a sanction, that sanction, till it is lifted.

We have made abundantly clear to them and I reinforced this with our partners during this last trip that we are prepared to deal with that issue inside the six-party process, alongside the six-party process, but we're not prepared to ignore it or to make some kind of arrangement by which we drop efforts to protect ourselves in return for getting North Korea to the talks.

So I have not - I am not aware of any North Korean effort to try to rejoin the talks. I'm not aware of any effort to, you know, come up with some creative proposals or to look for any ways to - that they could rejoin the talks. We have looked for ways to do that consistent with our view that we cannot just ignore these illicit activities. As I mentioned earlier, we are prepared to talk about it in the talks, alongside the talks. We're prepared to entertain ideas. But the North Koreans have given none.

And so the concern we all have is that the Macao issue is simply the latest of a series of pretexts for not attending talks. In this case however, they have stayed out for a year, a time during which they should have been preparing to implement the joint statement whose first anniversary took place a couple of days ago. Our concern of course is this has nothing to do with Macao and everything to do with the North Korean unwillingness to implement what they've agreed to.

[ ...Intervening Text... ]

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