U.S. and Taiwan (2009)

U.S. Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

News Transcript

Presenter: Senior Defense Official
March 25, 2009

DoD Background Briefing

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Thank you all for being here. I appreciate the opportunity to brief you, this afternoon, on the 2009 edition of the Department of Defense's annual report Congress on Military Power of the People's Republic of China.

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SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: And we include charts in the report that show a comparison both of China's publicly announced defense budget -- our low estimate and our high estimate -- and we also show a comparison between China's -- the different estimates for China's defense expenditure and how it compares to other regional powers in terms of the comparison between China and others.

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The PLA's modernization vis-a-vis Taiwan has continued over the past year, including its build-up of short-range missiles opposite the island. In the near term, China's armed forces are rapidly developing coercive capabilities for the purposes of deterring Taiwan's pursuit of de jure independence. These same capabilities could, in the future, be used to pressure Taiwan toward a settlement of the cross-strait dispute on PRC terms while simultaneously attempting to deter, delay or deny possible U.S. support for the island in case of conflict.

This modernization and the threat to Taiwan continues despite the reduction in cross-strait tensions over the last year, since Taiwan elected a new president.

The PLA is also developing longer-range capabilities that have implications beyond Taiwan. Some of these capabilities have allowed it to contribute cooperatively to the international community's responsibilities in areas such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and counterpiracy. And we have a special topic at the end of the report this year that goes into some detail about China's roles and activities in that area.

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Q: Does China today have the ability to deter, delay or deny any U.S. military action in defense of Taiwan?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: We don't actually do that kind of assessment in this report, and I'm probably not the best person to talk about that. That's -- that gets into an operational question. I mean, that's something that the U.S. PACOM would probably be better suited to answer.

Q: But it's just a quote, and it says that's what they're attempting to do.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Right.

Q: But you don't go into whether they can do it now.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: No, we don't. I mean, they're attempting to do it.

Q: And have they done anything in the past year that would be in this report that would enhance your concerns or cause PACOM to reconsider some of its operations or change any of its operations?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: No.

Q: So no major change.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: On the --

Q: They didn't cross any major threshold.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: No. No. I mean -- I mean, we continue to watch China's military developments and we -- you know, we adjust accordingly.

Last year -- I don't think there was any -- too many significant developments in terms of new capabilities being revealed -- you know, significant new capabilities being revealed. So the answer to your question, no.

Q: Can you maybe explain in layman's terms what some of these longer-range capabilities and more disruptive capabilities are that you mention in the report?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Longer-range capabilities could include conventional ballistic missiles, both the short-range ballistic missiles like the ones that are deployed opposite Taiwan, but also longer-range, like conventional medium-range ballistic missiles, which is something that they're working on, as well as the DF-21D, which is an anti-ship ballistic missile that they're working on. That's based on a CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missile air frame. Those are the types of things that we would consider, you know, disruptive in terms of longer-range capabilities.

But you also have disruptive capabilities more on the nontraditional side, where, you know, it's the counter-space systems, not only the anti-satellite weapon that they tested in 2007, but also other types of counter-space or space control systems, like satellite communication jammers, directed energy weapons, these types of things.

And when we talk about what a disruptive capability is, I mean, a lot of those things kind of fall into the category that would be anti-access and area denial, or things that would significantly alter the extant military balance. You know, you could look at, you know, some of their advanced air-defense systems. Those are capabilities that allow them to project a(n) air defense envelope farther and farther from China and into the Western Pacific. So your capabilities certainly affect the security assessments of other countries.

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Q: What's your take on why the Chinese are continuing to increase the number of short-range ballistic missiles aimed across the Taiwan Strait every year by a hundred or so, as you say in this report? How does that reconcile with the recent, you know, thaw in cross-strait relations?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: You know, that's actually a question I'd like to hear the answer from the Chinese on, I mean, honestly.

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Q: Are you getting any new letters of intent from Taiwan or pricing and availability requests from Taiwan for new arms purchases that are in response to some of the modernization trends you laid out in this report?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Well, we continue our discussions with Taiwan on defense and security interactions -- you know, our long-standing policy is that we don't talk about a specific weapons system or a specific arms sale. We just don't do it until we -- until we make the decision and we notify Congress.

Q: Quick follow-up. Last October there was the notification of $6.4 billion. Those have all been approved by Congress now and are in the works in various stages?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: The ones that we notified the Congress -- have been approved.

Q: --What kind of guarantees by the U.S. to Taiwan, that Taiwan will not be -- that U.S. would come to help Taiwan if Taiwan would -- if an invasion was prepared of Taiwan.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Well, under our Taiwan Relations Act, the United States will provide defense articles and services in sufficient quantity to Taiwan to enable it to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. And that is something that we are obligated to -- that's a critical part of our policy, and that policy remains in effect.

At the same time, the Taiwan Relations Act also says that we'll maintain the capacity to resist any forms of coercion or aggression to change the status of Taiwan. And that's also our policy, and that remains in effect.

Q: It's not a NATO-type agreement.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: (No ?).

Q: It's not a -- it's -- or it's a Japan-American agreement -- it's not that kind of agreement.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: No.

Q: (Off mike) -- that strong.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Well, I mean, when we had to change -- when we changed diplomatic recognition, we had to terminate the mutual defense treaty that we had with Taiwan. So we do not have a defense treaty with Taiwan. But what we do have is the Taiwan Relations Act, and we have a robust set of defense and security assistance exchanges with Taiwan that's consistent with our unofficial relationship.

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